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Philosophical Perspectives on Earth System Modeling:
Truth, Adequacy, and Understanding
G. Gramelsberger1, J. Lenhard2, and W.S. Parker3
1Theory of Science and Technology, RWTH Aachen University, Aachen, Germany, 2Department of Philosophy, Bielefeld
University, Bielefeld, Germany, 3Department of Philosophy, Durham University, Durham, UK
Abstract We explore three questions about Earth system modeling that are of both scientiﬁc and
philosophical interest: What kind of understanding can be gained via complex Earth system models?
How can the limits of understanding be bypassed or managed? How should the task of evaluating Earth
system models be conceptualized?
1. Introduction
Increasingly, philosophers of science are interested in computer simulation in science. There is growing
awareness that complex simulation modeling—including Earth system modeling (ESM)—presents a
number of challenges to traditional philosophical conceptions of how science works. The contributors to
this paper explore several of these challenges, developing ideas that they presented in a special session
of the fourth International Conference on ESM (4ICESM), held in Hamburg, Germany, in August 2017.
In section 2, Johannes Lenhard discusses the challenge of understanding via complex Earth System
Models; he outlines a “pragmatic” perspective on understanding informed by competing past accounts.
Continuing with the topic of understanding in section 3, Gabriele Gramelsberger considers how limits
to understanding can be bypassed or managed. She points to the role of normative practices, especially
the practice of believing in “true” values when developing models and the practice of sensitive wording
when evaluating models and communicating uncertainties. The topic of model evaluation is addressed
further in section 4, where Wendy Parker outlines an adequacy‐for‐purpose approach to evaluation and
considers its implications for modeling practice. Section 5 offers some closing remarks.
2. Understanding and Complexity—The Dilemma of Growth (J. Lenhard)
All sciences—natural ones, social ones, and humanities alike—tend to develop a terminology that distances
them from ordinary language and thinking. However, there are instances where common and scientiﬁc
concepts meet, typically not without tension. This section discusses one such instance: the notion of
understanding. Scientists might employ procedures only specialists can follow; still, when their goal is to
“understand” something, practically everybody knows what they are after. To understand something is part
of our common culture. Or so it seems.
Articulating a notion of understanding has been a challenge for philosophy throughout history. The philo-
sophy of science (PhS), in particular, has grappled with the relationship between understanding and scien-
tiﬁc explanation. Recently, methods of computer simulation have created a new challenge—they are
heavily based on mathematical models that are themselves so complex that some important aspects of their
behavior are accessible only via simulation experiments. ESM is a prime example of a ﬁeld in which this chal-
lenge arises. Complex simulation models are indispensable, and the community tries to ﬁnd strategies to
establish and to maintain understanding of the models' behavior and of the Earth System itself. Such strate-
gies ﬁgured prominently in many contributions to the 4ICESM conference in Hamburg in 2017. The remain-
der of this section pursues the idea that dealing with simulationmodels might inﬂuence and even change our
concept of understanding. After brieﬂy analyzing understanding as a goal for simulation modeling, a prag-
matic concept of understanding is proposed that contributes to the discussion in both ESM and PhS.
2.1. The Dilemma of Growth Makes Understanding an Urgent Topic in ESM
In ESM, two tendencies stand in conﬂict with each other. On the one hand, simulation modeling is the
method of choice (arguably without alternative) for understanding the dynamics of a system as complex
©2019. American Geophysical Union.
All Rights Reserved.
This is an open access article under the
terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License, which permits use,
distribution and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original work is
properly cited.
COMMENTARY
10.1029/2019MS001720
Special Section:
Historical, Philosophical and
Sociological Perspectives on
Earth System Modeling
Key Points:
• Earth System Modeling can provide
"pragmatic" understanding.
• Normative practices help modelers
to deal with limits of understanding.
• An adequacy‐for‐purpose approach
to model evaluation has
implications for practice.
Correspondence to:
W. S. Parker,
wendy.parker@durham.ac.uk
Citation:
Gramelsberger, G., Lenhard, J., &
Parker, W. S. (2020). Philosophical
perspectives on Earth system modeling:
Truth, adequacy, and understanding.
Journal of Advances in Modeling Earth
Systems, 12, e2019MS001720. https://
doi.org/10.1029/2019MS001720
Received 18 APR 2019
Accepted 25 NOV 2019
Accepted article online 10 DEC 2019
GRAMELSBERGER ET AL. 1 of 10
as the Earth System. On the other hand, the growing complexity of the models themselves seems to jeopar-
dize understanding. These two tendencies constitute what can be called a “dilemma of growth.” This
dilemma has received attention in the ESM community. Manabe (2006), for instance, pointed out that
understanding is the central goal of climate modeling and that this means “getting the essence of the
mechanism.” ESM, Manabe added, is bound to develop ever more complex models, leaving it unclear
whether the goal can be reached at all. The principal strategy of mathematical modeling is to reduce com-
plexity by stripping off aspects until only the essence remains. However, atmospheric circulation models
do not only include fundamental equations (arguably what “essence” refers to) but also a plethora of addi-
tions like parameterizations of clouds and chemistry modules. Furthermore, ESM works with interacting
models of atmosphere, ocean, and so forth. The principal strategy hence seems to be hardly feasible for ESM.
Both PhS and ESM have started to investigate understanding in connection with simulation. Parker (2014)
focuses on climate modeling, discerns two sorts of understanding, and discusses how simulation can contri-
bute to them. In a broad sense, she points out that simulation can reveal the implications of physical assump-
tions so that complex phenomena can be explored by conceptualmodels.While this is correct, the dilemma of
growth arises when models become too complex—in a sense, when too many assumptions are at work.
Climate scientists like Sandrine Bony, Isaac Held, and Bjorn Stevens (Bony et al., 2013; Held, 2005) have for-
mulated and analyzed variants of the dilemma. One approach to rescuing understanding invokes modularity
and hierarchies. The hope is that small and well‐understood models can be knitted together in larger hierar-
chies so that understanding extends to thewhole. However, the prospects of this approach are not yet clear, in
part because modularity tends to erode in larger simulation models, leading to a problem of “holism” (see
Lenhard, 2018). Below it is argued that practices of ESM—and complex simulation modeling in general—
might suggest a concept of understanding that differs from the concept Manabe referred to.
2.2. Understanding Is an Established but Contested Concept
How do philosophers of science explicate the notion of understanding? Since this is not a systematical essay
about the history of philosophy, it is helpful to simplify (see de Regt et al., 2009, for a recent anthology on
understanding). A majority position in PhS conceives of understanding as an add‐on to explanation, where
the latter is cast in objective terms like logical relationships. If something explains a phenomenon, it has the
potential to also provide understanding. A standard example is the orbit of a planet that is explained by a law
of nature (gravitation) plus initial and boundary conditions (like the mass of the planet). This position has
been elaborated by a group of philosophers that spans several generations, among them the classic
Hempel (in the 1930s), the unconventional Toulmin (1960s), and Bangu (2017) who investigates the role
of uniﬁcation for understanding. This position stresses the objective component of understanding—does
the form of an orbit in fact derive from law(s) plus conditions? It might therefore be called the “derivation
plus” conception. This position presupposes that the entities in play, together with their relationships, are
transparent enough for model users to recognize what derives from what.
A different strand in philosophy (and history) identiﬁes the concept of understanding as an issue where
sciences and humanities diverge. This strand juxtaposes understanding with explanation, counting the latter
to the sciences and the former to the humanities (see von Wright, 1971, for an inﬂuential account). On this
sort of view, a chess player understands her opponent, when her expectations of what comes next match
with what comes next. Call this the “match” conception of understanding. This conception remains agnostic
about the mechanisms that created some phenomenon of interest but stresses the properties of representa-
tions as imitations.
Weber (1913) offered an interesting approach that combines both conceptions. He called it “verstehendes
Erklären” (understanding‐explanation) and thought it was an adequate concept for the ﬁeld of sociology
when it investigates the behavior of individuals and entire societies. Weber proposed to understand societal
behavior in terms of rational actors who act in order to advance their purposes (“zweckrational,” purpose‐
rational). To know how a certain purpose relates to certain actions would require “matching” the actor's per-
spective; concluding that the actions would be rational in this sense—that is, would serve the purpose of
interest—would explain them (in a derivation manner). Weber was fully aware that this type of action‐pur-
pose explanation is an ideal type, that is, good for orientation but never fully feasible in reality. He warned
that this kind of understanding‐explanation, due to its subjective components, would require a validation
with causal tests.
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2.3. A Pragmatic Concept of Understanding
It seems that ESM also searches for something that combines both conceptions of understanding, although
in a way different from what Weber envisioned for sociology. The derivation part plays an important role,
since general fundamental equations serve as a basis for ESM and they are fundamental (basic, primitive,
or “core” are related terms) in the sense that important properties of the model atmosphere's circulation
derive from them. This basis is complemented by parts that count as less fundamental, like parameteriza-
tions. Additionally, the model is transformed into discrete, algorithmic versions that run on a computer.
The entire model assembly then goes through repeated adjustment cycles. Whether these adjustments are
located on the level of discretization or on the level of some parameterization, the model assemblies are
repeatedly modiﬁed via a feedback loop that compares actual (i.e., simulated) with intended model behavior
(known data). In this way, model assumptions and parameter value assignments act together and can
become interconnected, with choices made in some parts of the model affected by choices alreadymade else-
where; as a consequence, there may be a loss of some transparency regarding which aspect derives from
which assumptions. Even so, modelers often can acquire “a feel” for what kinds of adjustments might be use-
ful for attaining what kind of behavior. A similar kind of “feeling” is known from practices of artisans, tech-
nicians, and engineers when they work with instruments and tune machines (cf. Ferguson, 1992).
Such acquaintance with model behavior can be a work‐around for building an adequate “inner” representa-
tion (like the chess player did) when simpliﬁcation/idealization strategies are not available—as in the case of
ESM. However, this work‐around does not lead to understanding in the traditional sense. There are no sim-
ple models involved that would enable understanding by “capturing the essence of a phenomenon” (Held,
2005, 1609). Nevertheless, simulation provides understanding—if only in the weaker, pragmatic sense of get-
ting acquainted with model behavior.
Simulationmethodology matters. Before the use of computer simulationmethods, theoretical principles and
what derives from themwere separated from pragmatic adjustments. The latter could be added but remained
mostly unconnected to the principled part. Consider the work of Vilhelm Bjerknes who had formulated the
Fundamental Equations in 1904, about half a century before general circulationmodels could be built. These
equations had little use in the practice of weather prediction since there was no way in which one could
derive interesting predictions from them. For his practical work, Bjerknes relied on quite independent gra-
phical approaches. Today, with simulation, modeling can knit together principled parts with adjustments.
In one and the same process, researchers are getting acquaintedwithmodel behavior AND areﬁnding a prin-
cipled motivation. The ﬁrst part refers to “match” and the second part to “derivation.”
2.4. An Uneasy Position for Understanding
Even if ESM can provide a pragmatic kind of understanding, it does not come with the virtues of the deriva-
tional type. In particular, because theoretical principles are only part of an ESM, phenomena understood in
the pragmatic way via ESM lack the very tight connection to theoretical explanation that is possible in cases
of simple analytic derivation from ﬁrst principles. Most philosophers of science might be disappointed. A
notable exception is van Fraassen (1980) who advocates a pragmatic concept of understanding that also does
without derivational relationships. The family resemblance between the view articulated in here and that of
van Fraassen is signaled by speaking of pragmatic understanding, but an exploration of differences must
await a lengthier discussion.
Nevertheless, it is important to think about the limits of understanding, that is, what kind of understanding
can be reached (or not) by what kind of modeling. From the perspective of philosophy, it is important to see
that the concept of understanding is not historically ﬁxed but rather affected by scientiﬁc practices. New
instrumentation, importantly the computer, affects and channels concepts like understanding. ESM is ques-
tioning the limits of the (traditional) concept of understanding and exploring what cannot be understood in
the (good) old way. When it comes to conceptions of understanding here, it might be wise to adopt the motto
known from Stills (1970): “If you can't be with the one you love, love the one you're with.”
To be clear, the claim here is not that pragmatic understanding should or in fact must become the goal of
ESM. The case is open in an interesting way. There is a fruitful mutual relationship between ESM and
PhS, since both want to ﬁnd adequate ways of talking about limitations of understanding. There are limita-
tions of established concepts that circumscribe goals (what does it mean to understand something?), and
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there are limitations of methods to attain these goals (what aim makes sense given the methodology and
instrumentation?). Neither is it justiﬁed to stick to all aspects of established concepts—what “understand-
ing”means might be affected by what scientiﬁc methods can achieve—nor is it justiﬁed to freely adapt con-
cepts, like understanding, to whatever current approaches claim as their success, else understanding would
become trivial. When researchers in ESM continue to critically reﬂect on what should be understood but
cannot and what can be understood but in an unorthodox way, they contribute to an ongoing and fruitful
philosophical discussion about concepts of understanding.
3. Normative Practices in ESM (G. Gramelsberger)
Limitations of understanding in ESM, as outlined in the previous section, are an intrinsic aspect of a science
based on complex models. Such limitations result from uncertainties due to the incompleteness and fallibi-
lity of knowledge (epistemic uncertainty), the intrinsically complex character of a natural system (ontic
uncertainty), and the overwhelming complexity of ESM (Petersen, 2006, 2011). Nevertheless, limitations
of understanding have a positive role too, in that they drive progress in scientiﬁc research with the aim of
having a better understanding of models―and, through the lens of these models, of natural processes and
phenomena. Modeling, as Jules Charney long since proposed, consists of a “‘hierarchy of pilot problems’,
each of which would contain more physical, numerical, and observable aspects of the general forecast than
the preceding ones” (Charney quoted in Harper, 2008, 124). Thus, in this context, scientiﬁc knowledge is per
se knowledge in the making. If this is true, the interesting question is the following: How can current limita-
tions to understanding be overcome in modeling? One possible answer is through practices of normativity.
Norms in science are the set of rules that govern how scientists do their work. The sociologist Merton (1942,
p. 278) deﬁned four fundamental norms of science: the universal nature of science and associated values
such as objectivity, impersonality, and simplicity; communalism or “open science and data” in today's par-
lance; the disinterestedness of scientists and the concomitant scrutiny of scientiﬁc results and values like
reproducibility; and, last but not least, science as the endeavor of organized skepticism—“a methodological
and an institutional mandate.” These are epistemic norms and values, respectively. Of course, the most basic
epistemic norm of all is the search for truth or, at least, evidence. “Truth,” from a philosophical perspective,
is the horizon to which science tries to progress. As theories and models are semiotic representations of
empirical phenomena and interrelations, including abstractions, heuristics, and purposes, they can never
be “true” as a whole, but their results can be well conﬁrmed in general and in detail, providing
substantial evidence.
Merton's norms are basic norms, and, in particular, the norm of objectivity refers to the ideal that science can
progress toward truth without value commitments, purposes, and community bias. However, for complex
models, a tension occurs between “truth” as a norm and the intrinsic complexity leading to limitations of
understanding. Against this backdrop, the above questions can be rearticulated in the following way:
Which normative practices help modelers to deal with limits of understanding and in particular with mod-
eling as knowledge in the making?
3.1. Modeling as Knowledge in the Making
If Charney is right andmodeling is a process led by a “hierarchy of pilot problems” including more andmore
physical, numerical, and observable aspects, then a model is an eternal constructing site. In other word,
models are never completed but become increasingly complex; Earth system models mark the current end
of this development. However, Earth system models contain submodels and subscale parameters which
are at different stages of epistemic development, for instance, oceanic carbon models and parametrizations
of the Wegener‐Bergeron‐Findeisen (WBF) process, respectively.
Oceanic carbon models, as discussed in a paper by Le Queré (2006) entitled, “The unknown and the uncer-
tain of Earth system modelling,” are at early stages of model development, where key observational data are
lacking. Although such a case is somewhat unusual, it provides some insights into modeling as knowledge in
the making. Le Queré (2006) poses the question: Against what are these models evaluated when observa-
tional data are lacking?, And the answer she gives is: “Thus, the ﬁrst few published [model] results initially
take the place of the truth. […] Although these results may be correct because the physical dynamics has
been constrained in part by observations, the biological efﬁciency remains unexplored” (p. 496). “Truth”
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in this sense is a somewhat crude and temporary practice of normativity, until it is replaced by reliable obser-
vational data. However, the important contribution of such a modeling phase is that models can inspire new
measurement campaigns.
Not surprisingly, the next stage in development is guided by the collection of observational data. These data
do not necessarily conﬁrmmodel results but often contradict them, thus ushering in the “chaos phase”—the
most creative phase of modeling. Often, model reﬁnement and the progress of knowledge result when evi-
dence from observations contradicts proposed models. Thus, modelers are challenged to explore new possi-
bilities, concepts, and methods. In this phase, Le Queré elaborates, “models tend to go their own way,
leading to some incoherence between model results and the state of knowledge” (ibid.). Examples of models
at this phase include terrestrial carbon models. Modeling here serves as an epistemic driver to develop a bet-
ter understanding of the observational ﬁndings, which are seen as “true” values—the horizon to which mod-
eling tries to progress.
Finally, a further phase follows, “when the basic concepts have been understood and included in models,
and when reliable observations can be used to eliminate outlier model results” (ibid.). Global climate models
are examples from this phase. In this phase, uncertainty is reduced by increasing the amount of observa-
tional data and by efforts to ﬁne‐tune the processes in the models. Now, models can be used for prognosti-
cating, and these prognoses can be evaluated against observational data, which is the standard practice in
science. A model at this stage of development is “good” if its results perform well, that is, accord with
observational data.
Nevertheless, in the development sketched here, it is not accordance with “truth” but rather incoher-
ence among models and modeling results which becomes fruitful for gaining new knowledge.
Engaging with and resolving this incoherence corresponds to Merton's norm of science as the endeavor
of organized skepticism.
3.2. What Does “Performing Well”Mean?
How can modelers tell whether their models are “good”? The primary indicator is model performance, a
good ﬁt to data. However, even if true values do exist, does “evidence” of a model performing well automa-
tically mean that the model is “true”? Of course, no such transfer of “truth” from data to models occurs.
Model results will never match the parameter values describing a system's behavior exactly
(Gramelsberger & Feichter, 2011; Lenhard, 2011), but a “good” model is believed to represent the relevant
processes of a natural system well. There are thus at least two senses in which models can be “good,” as
outlined below.
On the one hand, as Charney aptly outlined, developing a “good”model involves improving process under-
standing through grounding the modeling more soundly in physics. For subscale parametrizations in parti-
cular, such as cloud microphysics, improvement in this sense is gained through better representation of
physics. However, improvement in process understanding does not necessarily imply improved model per-
formance. A crudely or even incorrectly implemented representation of a process such as the WBF mechan-
ism in cloud physics can perform well within an ESM, and improving WBF representation does not
necessarily improve model performance. Such improvement in representation reﬂects process understand-
ing and, subsequently, can advance understanding of the interplay of model parts and mechanisms. In turn,
this understanding can lead to further model development that improves model performance.
On the other hand, leaving the discussion of tuning aside (Mauritsen et al., 2012; Stainforth et al., 2005),
“good” refers to empirical accuracy (model results ﬁt observation‐based data) and robustness (agreement
with other models) (Baumberger et al., 2017). In recent decades, climate science has developed an impressive
set of practices for evaluating models. Model experiments contributing to the Assessment Reports of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, for example, are expected to follow speciﬁc practices of eva-
luation like reporting performance metrics on the system, component, and parameter levels; participating
in model intercomparison; and validation of ensemble prognoses.
However, ESMs deal with a wide range of climate variables. These variables are sometimes difﬁcult to
measure, requiring complex data modeling, as in the cases of satellite data and reanalysis data
(Edwards, 2010). Such data, with their associated uncertainties, may seem to challenge the normative prac-
tice of comparing to “true values,” but only insofar as data are understood in a naïve way as directly
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reﬂecting true values (Lloyd, 2012); all data are samples and can only be as accurate as the instruments
that measure them. A further problem is that models require homogeneously distributed observational
data, which do not exist, covering long time periods. However, many practices have been developed to deal
with this problem and to standardize data sets, that is, to articulate data norms. Norms for data interpola-
tion, for proxy data, and for reanalysis data are good examples of generating standardized data sets for the
entire community (Edwards, 2010). Such “data norms” or “data standards” are necessary conditions for
model intercomparison and model evaluation.
3.3. The Unique Practice of Sensitive Wording in Climate Science
Finally, there is a unique way in which climate science manages the epistemic challenges that are inherent
in the use of complex models to study a complex system: through the normative practice of sensitive word-
ing. The development of this normative practice is rooted in the sociopolitical expectations placed on climate
science to produce information that can be trusted in decision making. Hardly any other discipline has
developed such a serious commitment to sensitive wording, motivated by ethical considerations. This com-
mitment is most apparent in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Assessment Reports. Among
other ways, it manifests in the use of the term “projection,” rather than “prediction” or “forecast” (Bray &
von Storch, 2009) and in the introduction of a “likelihood language” to describe scientiﬁc uncertainties, pre-
scribing standardized terms such as “likely” or “very likely” according to deﬁnitions based on a probabilistic
scale (Landström, 2017; Moss & Schneider, 2000).
Sensitive wording is also important when considering concepts like “truth,” “true values,” “veriﬁcation,”
and even “validation.” In a landmark paper, Oreskes et al. (1994) argued for the normative practice of sen-
sitive wording about model evaluation, avoiding the term “veriﬁcation.”Numerical models in Earth science
are too complex to be veriﬁed, they argued. The same holds for “validation,” often used synonymously with
veriﬁcation; its use is similarly misleading, as “the term valid might be useful for assertions about a generic
computer code but is clearly misleading if used to refer to actual model results in any particular realization”
(Oreskes et al. 1994, p. 642). Their analysis recommends the terminology of “conﬁrmation” in model evalua-
tion instead—though, as argued by Parker below, sensitive wording may be required even when speaking of
conﬁrmation. Another term could be “reliability.” Petersen (2006) differentiated between two notions of
reliability: the reliability of a model result for a speciﬁc domain and the reliability of a model related to its
methodological quality. (These notions are distinct, of course, from reliability in the sense of calibrated prob-
abilistic forecasts.) However, both “conﬁrmation” and “reliability” are relational attributes, which do not
connote that the truth of a model has been established, as “veriﬁcation” and “validation” may seem to do.
“Conﬁrmation” and “reliability” allow for appreciating that modeling is knowledge in the making and that
science, ﬁrst and foremost, is led by intellectual curiosity—a value Merton forgot to mention in his list.
4. Evaluating Models: An Adequacy‐for‐Purpose View (W. Parker)
Alongside efforts to develop, improve, and understand ESMs, we need to evaluate them. How should the
task of model evaluation be conceptualized? Here is one intuitively appealing starting point, already touched
upon in the last section: A model is a “good”model of a real system just to the extent that it accurately repre-
sents that system. Model evaluation is then understood as an activity that seeks to learn how accurately a
model represents a real system. A standard approach would be to compare the model's assumptions and pre-
dictions to observations of the system, documenting the degree of model‐data ﬁt in various respects. Model
improvement occurs, on this way of thinking, when there is an increase, in some overall sense, in the repre-
sentational accuracy of themodel. In the ideal limit, one imagines arriving at a model that is a perfectly accu-
rate and complete representation of the real system. (see, e.g., Teller, 2001, discussing the “Perfect Model
Model” and Knuuttila, 2011, p.267, on “the idea that scientiﬁc representation should aim for as accurate a
representation as possible.”)
An alternative perspective sees models as tools that scientists wish to use for particular predictive, explana-
tory, and other purposes (Currie, 2018; Giere, 2004; Knuuttila, 2011; Morrison & Morgan, 1999). Model eva-
luation is conceptualized as an activity that seeks to learn whether a model is adequate for one or more
purposes of interest (for related views, see Caswell, 1976; Rykiel, 1996; NRC, 2007; Parker, 2009;
Baumberger et al., 2017). The evaluator focuses on whether the model represents the real system sufﬁciently
accurately in those respects that are relevant for the achieving the purpose(s). On this “adequacy‐for‐
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purpose” view, model quality itself is purpose relative. Similarly, model improvement occurs relative to
some range of applications, with priority placed on developing models in ways that serve those applications.
These two perspectives differ in numerous respects. Yet this does not mean that one must be chosen as the
“correct” way to think about model evaluation; each view—and indeed others as well—might be advanta-
geous in some circumstances. (Some additional views are the veriﬁcation and validation framework of
Oberkampf & Roy, 2010; the informal Bayesian approach suggested by Schmidt & Sherwood, 2015; and
the possibilist approach advocated by Katzav, 2014.) Increasingly, however, ESMs and other climate models
are being called upon to provide speciﬁc information in support of decision making, suggesting that an ade-
quacy‐for‐purpose perspective will often be an attractive option in this context; what is of interest in such
cases is not how accurately an ESM represents the world in some overall sense, but whether it can provide
the speciﬁc information that is sought. In what follows, an adequacy‐for‐purpose view is explored in more
detail, and some implications of the view are highlighted.
4.1. Further Fundamentals of an Adequacy‐for‐Purpose View
In order to employ an adequacy‐for‐purpose view, one needs to have some idea of what it means for a model
(or any other tool) to be adequate‐for‐purpose. Upon reﬂection, it becomes clear that many different notions
of adequacy are possible. A model might be adequate for a purpose P in principle, in the sense that if it were
used in just the right way and in favorable circumstances, then P could at least sometimes be achieved. More
often, scientists will be interested in whether a model is adequate for a purpose in practice, that is, given the
way the model actually has been or will be used. Even then, it is useful to distinguish further varieties of ade-
quacy. Sometimes, what is of interest is whether amodel is adequate for purpose P in a given instance, that is,
whether the use of the model in a particular instance did or will result in P. A model that is used to correctly
predict the occurrence and duration of a particular heat wave is adequate (in this sense) for that predictive
purpose, even if in many other cases it fails to correctly predict that a heat wave is coming. Perhaps more
often, scientists are interested not in a particular instance of use, but in whether, in a given type of use of
the model, P will very often be achieved. They want to know whether, given the way they actually will be
using their model (e.g., as an element in a particular forecasting system), they will very often succeed in pre-
dicting heat waves. (This can also be expressed in terms of forecast skill.) The point is that in order to evaluate
a model's adequacy‐for‐purpose—and to avoid misunderstandings—one needs to be clear about which vari-
ety of adequacy is of interest.
Note that, on the conceptions of adequacy‐for‐purpose just articulated, a model (and indeed any other tool)
is adequate for a purpose in a particular instance or type of use. A model can be adequate for a purpose P in
one instance or type of use but not in another, due to differences in user, methodology, or circumstances.
Continuing with the heatwave example, the model might fail to be adequate‐for‐purpose (in the instance
or type sense) if it is used in conjunction with a data assimilation scheme—an aspect of methodology—with
particular limitations; with a different data assimilation scheme, the samemodel might be adequate. (As this
suggests, it might be preferable to take the forecast system as a whole to be the tool whose adequacy is eval-
uated. Likewise, sometimes scientists will be interested in the adequacy‐for‐purpose of a set of models, for
example, the adequacy of an ensemble for revealing the full range of outcomes that are plausible.) The rele-
vance of the user is easiest to see for pedagogical and explanatory purposes: Whether a model is adequate (in
the instance or type sense) for developing a correct explanation of a particular phenomenon can depend not
only on whether the model represents sufﬁciently well the processes that give rise to the phenomenon and
on what kind of experiments are performed on the model (e.g., turning processes off to see the effects) but
also on the user's background knowledge and reasoning abilities. Evaluation of a model's adequacy‐for‐pur-
pose in practice will require attention to these broader considerations—the methodology, the user, and the
circumstances of use—not just how the model represents the world.
It is also important to understand how concepts like truth, conﬁrmation, and conﬁdence can play a role
under an adequacy‐for‐purpose view. On this view, model evaluation seeks to learn whether it is true that
a model is adequate for one or more purposes of interest. Conﬁdence that a model is adequate (or not) for
a purpose of interest can stem from what is known about how the model was constructed, as well as from
how the model is found to perform in various tests, for example, against relevant observational data or other
models (Baumberger et al., 2017). Such tests can sometimes be said to conﬁrm (i.e., provide some support for)
or disconﬁrm (i.e., provide some evidence against) hypotheses about a model's adequacy for particular
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purposes. To return to the heatwave example, if the forecast model shows little skill in predicting the occur-
rence of heat waves when tested on past data (e.g., in hindcast mode), this disconﬁrms the hypothesis that
themodel is adequate (in the type sense) for very skillfully forecasting future heatwaves. Onemight also seek
to test and conﬁrm/disconﬁrm other sorts of hypotheses that bear on conclusions about a model's adequacy,
for example, the hypothesis that the model has at least a moderately accurate representation of a particular
physical process that is crucial to the model's being used successfully for the purpose at hand. What one
should not claim to conﬁrm is the model as a whole; this would make little sense, as it is usually known from
the outset that the model incorporates some assumptions that are false (and perhaps not even approximately
true). Here, it becomes apparent how sensitive wording is required even when employing the concept of con-
ﬁrmation (see also section 3.3).
Unfortunately, while it is relatively clear in the heatwave example whether the model's performance on past
data is evidence for or against its adequacy‐for‐purpose, in other cases, it can be unclear. Complicating fac-
tors include—among other things—model tuning, limited information about observational uncertainties,
and purposes that require simulating the behavior of the real system under boundary conditions different
from those for which data are available (as in climate change projection; see also Parker, 2018; Schmidt &
Sherwood, 2015, p.156). When it is unclear whether there is good evidence that a model is adequate for a
purpose of interest, however, it is worth considering whether there is some related purpose for which the
evidence of model adequacy (or inadequacy) is clearer. For example, it might be unclear whether today's cli-
mate models are adequate for projecting future climate with a speciﬁed level of accuracy, but there might be
good reason to think that they are adequate for providing plausible projections (Parker, 2009). It is also pos-
sible, of course, that a model will be adequate for purposes that go beyond those for which it was originally
expected or hoped to be adequate. This might be discovered in the ordinary course of examiningmodel beha-
vior or when surprising modeling results turn out to be largely correct, giving rise to new lines of inquiry.
4.2. Some Implications for Practice
Adopting an adequacy‐for‐purpose view has numerous implications for practice. It was already noted above,
for example, that evaluating adequacy‐for‐purpose in practice requires considering not just how a model
represents a real‐world system but also the methodology in which the model will be embedded (e.g., a
broader forecast system), the background circumstances in which it will be used, and sometimes even prop-
erties of the model user(s). Three additional implications will be discussed here.
A ﬁrst implication concerns the construction and selection of performance metrics in model evaluation. On
an adequacy‐for‐purpose view, evaluators should aim to tailor metrics of performance to the purpose of
interest. That is, they should try to identify metrics that will be most informative about the model's adequacy
for that purpose, giving greater attention in to performance on those that are thought to be most relevant.
The selection of relevant performance metrics will often rely on “process understanding,” especially under-
standing of which processes in the system strongly shape the behavior or phenomenon of interest
(Baumberger et al., 2017; Eyring et al., 2019; Herger et al., 2018). It is important to keep in mind, however,
that for many purposes, the evaluation of a model's adequacy‐for‐purpose should consider more than just
performance: the model's resolution, which simpliﬁcations and idealizations it includes, how and to which
data it has been tuned, and so on, can all be relevant considerations. Put differently: Even a tailored metric of
performance is not necessarily a metric of quality‐for‐a‐purpose.
A second implication concerns the interpretation of model uncertainty, including structural and parameter
uncertainty. Rather than thinking of model uncertainty as uncertainty about what would constitute a perfect
model, one thinks of it as uncertainty about which model structure(s) and parameter values would make for
an adequate model in a given instance or context of use. In some situations, for example, when conducting
perturbed physics ensemble studies, it will be helpful to think of parameter uncertainty as uncertainty about
the parameter values that will give the best results for output quantities of interest, given the chosen model
structure. Sampling this uncertainty and then propagating it via the ensemble will give an estimate of uncer-
tainty about the best results that the model can give for those output quantities; to reach conclusions about
the behavior of the real system, one will need to consider how far from the truth even the best results from
the model might be (see, e.g., Sexton et al., 2012). The value of a given parameter that leads to the best results
for a given purpose, of course, might not be the true value (if such a true value exists), given errors elsewhere
in the model. Moreover, the value of a parameter that leads to the best results could differ from one purpose
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to the next. This might happen, for instance, if the different values help to compensate for different errors
elsewhere in the model, where some of those errors matter more for some purposes and others matter more
for other purposes.
A third implication concerns the interpretation of past successes of a model. It is tempting to think that a
model accrues credit or merits increased conﬁdence in a general way as it accumulates successes in use.
In a limited sense, this can be right: the broader the range of successes of a model, the more conﬁdent
one can be that the model's equations are at least approximately capturing the physical processes that
drive the system's behavior, at least on some spatiotemporal scales. An adequacy‐for‐purpose view, how-
ever, urges evaluators to consider explicitly what the particular successes (and failures) achieved thus far
indicate—if anything—about the adequacy of the model for the purpose at hand. It may be that the mod-
el's past successes, even if impressive, actually give one little reason to be conﬁdent that it is adequate for
the purpose at hand, for example, because the latter requires simulating with sufﬁcient accuracy a some-
what different set of physical processes, or simulating smaller‐scale details, than were required for those
past successes.
5. Concluding Remarks
Earth system models and other computer simulation models play a range of important roles in climate
science—and in many other ﬁelds—but also raise challenges that are of both scientiﬁc and philosophical
interest. The focus of this brief discussion has been on a set of interconnected challenges related to under-
standing and model evaluation. Here we have only scratched the surface of these issues, which merit further
discussion by philosophers and scientists alike. We are grateful for the opportunity to have started a conver-
sation on these issues at the 4ICESM conference and look forward to future exchanges.
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